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DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS PRO-

CEEDS WHEN REALTY DEVISED SUBJECT TO A CONDITION IS SOLD FOR DEBTS

-Testatrix devised a house and lot to the trustees of the First Methodist Church
Oil the condition that it be used for a parsonage. In administering the estate it
became necessary to sell this real estate. Seven thousand dollars was realized by
the sale, of which five thousand remained after debts were paid. This action
was brought by the executors to determine the respective rights of the trustees of
the First Methodist Church, the residuary legatee, and the heirs at law to this
five thousand dollar surplus. Held, the condition relating to the use of the
realty was rendered impossible by the forced sale and the trustees of the church
were entitled to the · whole of the surplus. Scobey 'lJ, Beckman, (Ind. App.

1942) 41 N. E. (2d) 847.
Although the problem as to the effect of a forced sale of premises devised
subject to a condition was dealt with rather summarily in the instant case it
seems worthy of greater consideration. At least two possible solutions, other than
the one adopted by the court, may be suggested. First is the one, apparently
urged on behalf of the residuary legatee in the instant case, that by the provisions of the will the testator intended the devisee to get the particular property
and since that property is no longer available for distribution, the provision is of
no effect. This is based on analogy to the doctrine that where the subject matter
of a· specific devise or legacy does not form a part of the testator's estate at the
time of his death the gift is adeemed.1 As a practical matter it would seem to

1ATXIN60N, WILLS,

§ ~43 (1937).

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

333

make little difference as to the legatee's enjoyment of the specific thing whether it
was alienated during the testator's lifetime or sold in the administration of his estate
before distribution. However, it is doubtful that the court would ever adopt
such ~ position in these cases. It would seem equally logical in any case where
devised property is sold for debts, but the general rule is that the surplus proceeds
from such sales go to the person or persons who would have taken the property
if the sale had not been necessary. 2 This general rule suggests the next possible
solution. The surplus proceeds could be divided between the owner of the base
fee and the owner of the power of termination in proportion to the relative
value of their respective interests, disregarding the sale. In a number of cases
this solution has been used in distributing eminent domain awards when the land
condemned was held on a condition subsequent as to its use: 8 The two situations
seem quite analogous. In both the condition relates to the use of the land and in
both the only possible breach of the condition is the involuntary alienation. The
fact that in the eminent domain cases the base fee has ordinarily taken effect in
rossession, while in cases like the instant one it has not, would seem of no significance. If this approach had been used in the instant case the result would no
doubt have been the same. In the eminent domain cases it has generally been
held that when the happening of the condition is not probable in the ordinary
course of events the whole award goes to the owner of the base fee, the courts in
effect saying that the chances of the power of termination becoming exercisable
are so remote that the- power is of no present value. 4 But situations may be
imagined in which it would be of considerable consequence whether the court
2 Wolfe v. Lewisburg Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 305 Pa. 583, 158 A. 567
(1932); Freeman v. Banks, {Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 91 S. W. (2d) 1078; 3 WoERNER,
AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed. § 562a (1923).
8 First Reformed Dutch Church of Gilboa v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206
N. Y. S. 132 (1924); Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N. H. 220, 72 A. 1085 (1909); Simes,
"The Effect of Impossibility Upon Conditions in Wills," 34 M1cH. L. REv. 909
(1936); 34 M1cH. L. REv. 530 (1936); 1 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 53 (1936);
EXPLANATORY NoTES ON PROPERTY RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 2), pp.
18-25 (1930). However, in some of the eminent domain cases the courts have used
the theory of the court in the instant case, that the condition relating to use is excused
by imoossibilitv so that the owner of the base fee takes the entire award. Scoville v.
McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 A. 479 (1892); Cincinnati v. Babb, 4 Ohio Dec. 464
{1893). See Lancaster Schoo] District v. Lancaster County, 295 Pa. 112, 144 A. 901
(1929), holding that the condition was not excused but that the condemnation made
the power of termination exercisable and, therefore, the owner of the power of termination was entitled to the whole award. In First Reformed Dutch Church of Gilboa v.
Croswe11 {supra) the court very nicely avoided considering the condemnation as a
breach of condition by reasoning that, since the condemnation cut off the base fee and
the power of termination at the same time, there was no time at which the power of
termina•ion could be exercised. Such reasoning would seem ~qua1ly applicable to a
case where the premises are sold to pay the testator's debts.
4 First Reformed Dutch Church of Gilboa v. Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206
N. Y. S. 132 (1924); Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N. H. 220, 72 A. 1085 (1909); Chandler
v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., IZ5 Mass. 544 {1878); I PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§ 53 comment b (1936).
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followed this theory or applied the doctrine of impossibility as the court did in the
instant case. For example, a case might arise in which the happening of the condition was probable. Under the doctrine of impossibility the whole of the surplus
would go to the devisee of the base fee, while under the suggested procedure the
surplus would have to be divided. Also, according to the better view, impossibility will have the effect of excusing the condition and creating a fee simple
absolute in the devisee of the base fee only in cases where it may be said that
the testator would have intended this result if he had foreseen the impossibility.5
Under the suggested procedure of dividing the proceeds according to the relative value of the interests, the rights of the parties in no way depend on the intent
of the testator. It may safely be assumed in most cases that the testator never
considered the happening of the contingency which makes the condition impossible. Therefore, it would seem better to put the parties in a position as close
ac; possible to that which they would have occupied if the contingency had not ·
occurred 6 than to speculate as to the probable wishes of the testator had he foreseen the contingency.
E. George Rudolph

5 In re Hil1's·wm, 215 Wis. 72, 253 N. W. 787 (1934) (legacy not devise);
Simes, "The Effect of Impossibility Upon Conditions in Wills," 34 MICH. L. REV.
909 ( 1936}; 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 748 ( I 936). While the results of the
cases are largely consistent with this, the rule is usually stated without qualification,
that when the condition becomes impossible, the owner of the base fee takes absolutely. Bryant's Admr. v. Dungan, 92 Ky. 627, 18 S. W. 636 (1892); Harrison v.
Harrison, 105 Ga. 517, 31 S. E. 455 (1898).
6 In two eminent domain cases the court went considerably further to accomplish
this end than merely dividing the award between the owner of the base fee and the
owner of the power of termination. In Lutes v. Louisville & N. Ry., 158 Ky. 259,
164 S. W. 792 ( I 914), the owner of the base fee conveyed to a railroad in order to
avoid condemnation and used the proceeds to buy other land. It was held that the
condition attached to this land and that on breach thereof it· would go to the grantor
of the original land. In the case of In re Cook's Will, 243 App. Di,·. 706, 277 N. Y. S.
26 (1935), where only part of the premises were condemned, the owner of the base
fee was directed to invest the proceeds, use the income for its own purpose (which
would be in compliance with the condition as to the use of the land) and hold the
principal in trust to pay over to the one having the power of termination in event the
condition was breached as to the remaining land.

l 28 U~ s. C. (.1940), § 41 (1) (b).·
3 36 Stat. L. noz (19n), 28 U.S. C. (1940), § n8.

